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ABSTRACT 
 
Demand response (DR) is increasingly recognized as an essential ingredient to well-functioning 
electricity markets. DR market potential studies can answer questions about the amount of DR available 
in a given area and from which market segments. Several recent DR market potential studies have been 
conducted, most adapting techniques used to estimate energy-efficiency (EE) potential. In this scoping 
study, we: reviewed and categorized seven recent DR market potential studies; recommended a 
methodology for estimating DR market potential for large, non-residential utility customers that uses 
price elasticities to account for behavior and prices; compiled participation rates and elasticity values from 
six DR options offered to large customers in recent years, and demonstrated our recommended 
methodology with large customer market potential scenarios at an illustrative Northeastern utility. We 
observe that EE and DR have several important differences that argue for an elasticity approach for large-
customer DR options that rely on customer-initiated response to prices, rather than the engineering 
approaches typical of EE potential studies. Base-case estimates suggest that offering DR options to large, 
non-residential customers results in 1-3% reductions in their class peak demand in response to prices or 
incentive payments of $500/MWh. Participation rates (i.e., enrollment in voluntary DR programs or 
acceptance of default hourly pricing) have the greatest influence on DR impacts of all factors studied, yet 
are the least well understood. Elasticity refinements to reflect the impact of enabling technologies and 
response at high prices provide more accurate market potential estimates, particularly when arc elasticities 
(rather than substitution elasticities) are estimated. 
 
Introduction 
 
Demand response (DR) is increasingly recognized as an essential ingredient to well functioning 
electricity markets. This growing consensus was formalized in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT), 
which established DR as an official policy of the U.S. government, and directed states (and their electric 
utilities) to consider implementing DR, with a particular focus on “price-based” mechanisms. The 
resulting deliberations, along with a variety of state and regional DR initiatives, are raising important 
policy questions: for example, How much DR is enough? How much is available? From what sources? At 
what cost?  
In this paper, we examine analytical techniques and data sources to support DR market 
assessments that can, in turn, answer the second and third of these questions. We focus on DR for large (> 
350 kW), commercial and industrial (C&I) customers, although many of the concepts could equally be 
applied to similar programs and tariffs for small commercial and residential customers.1 We define DR 
market potential as the amount of DR—measured as short-term load reductions in response to high prices 
or incentive payment offerings—that policymakers can expect to achieve by offering a particular set of 
                                                 
1 Our proposed approach may not be appropriate for direct load control programs, which involves cycling or shedding of 
equipment (e.g. air conditioners, water heaters) of residential and small commercial customers. 
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DR options to groups of similar customers (e.g. market segments) under expected market or operating 
conditions.2 
In this scoping study, we review analytical methods and data that can support market assessments 
(e.g., for dynamic pricing tariffs) or market potential studies (e.g., for programmatic DR) for DR options 
offered to large commercial, industrial and institutional utility customers. We comment on differences 
between energy efficiency (EE) and DR that make translation of methods for EE potential studies 
problematic, present a conceptual framework for estimating market potential for large customer DR, 
compile participation rates and elasticity values from six large customer dynamic pricing and DR 
programs and apply them to estimate DR market potential in an illustrative utility service territory. 
Finally, we present a research agenda that identifies additional information and improved methods that 
would support more reliable DR market assessments.  
 
Approaches Used to Study DR Market Potential 
 
A number of utilities and regional groups have performed DR market potential studies in recent 
years, primarily to develop the demand-side section of utility resource plans, or to assist with planning or 
screening of potential DR programs.3  A few states and regions have begun to set DR goals; market 
assessment studies could serve as a foundation to ensure that such goals are achievable, and help identify 
market segments and strategies to meet them. Studies of DR market potential necessarily involve 
estimating two separate elements: participation, the number of customers enrolling in programs or taking 
service on a dynamic pricing tariff; and response, quantities of load reductions at times of high prices or 
when curtailment incentives are offered. Among seven reviewed DR market potential studies, four 
distinct approaches were used: 4  
• Customer surveys—Participation rates and expected load curtailments are obtained from surveys 
of utility customers about their expected actions if offered hypothetical DR options and used to 
estimate market potential. This approach uses information obtained locally, but the responses are 
subjective—customers may not know what they would actually do (particularly if they have no 
prior DR experience), or may respond strategically. We found only one example of this approach.  
• Benchmarking—Participation rates and load reductions observed among customers in other 
jurisdictions are applied to the population of interest. An advantage of this approach is that it relies 
on actual customer experience and actions. However, it assumes that any differences in the 
customers and market context have an insignificant impact on participation and load response. 
Only one of the reviewed studies adopted this approach. 
• Engineering approach—Four of the seven reviewed studies used bottom-up engineering 
techniques, similar to those used to estimate EE market potential. They are variations on the 
approach of applying assumed participation and response rates to data on local customers, loads or 
equipment stock. These rates are typically assumed to be constant, regardless of price or incentive 
levels. 
• Elasticity approach—This approach, adopted by one of the reviewed studies, involves estimating 
price elasticities from the usage data of customers exposed to DR programs and/or dynamic 
                                                 
2 DR market potential can be expressed as a percentage reduction in market demand that can be expected at, for example, a 
price (or offered curtailment incentive) of $500/MWh. 
3 See Haeri and Gage (2006), Quantum Consulting and Summit Blue Consulting (2004), SCE (2003), and EPRI Solutions 
(2005).  
4 See Appendix A of Goldman et al. (2007) for a summary of the reviewed studies and their methods. 
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pricing tariffs. After determining an expected participation level, price elasticities are applied to 
the population of interest to estimate load impacts under an expected range of prices or level of 
financial incentives to curtail load. Like the benchmarking approach, elasticities are based on 
actual customer response. They also quantify the relationship between customer behavior (i.e., 
load reductions) and price. When demand models are used to estimate elasticities, variables can be 
introduced to account for customer- or market-specific factors that influence price response, 
enabling the translation of results to other jurisdictions that may vary in these factors. 
 
What Makes DR Different from EE? 
 
While EE and DR both involve modifying large customers’ use of and demand for electricity, they 
differ in several important ways that may affect market potential: The nature of participation—For DR 
options, participation involves two steps: enrolling in a program or tariff, usually on an annual (or other 
periodic) basis; and providing load reductions during specific events (e.g., system emergencies or periods 
of high prices). For EE, “participation” consists of a one-time decision to invest in EE measures or 
equipment. 
• The drivers of benefits—DR benefits often hinge on customer behavior (i.e., ability and 
willingness to curtail) in response to hourly prices, financial incentives, and/or system 
emergencies. EE-related savings are largely a function of the technical characteristics and 
performance of the installed equipment or measures.  
• The time horizon and valuation of benefits—From a customer perspective, DR benefits—which 
depend on rare events that occur in near-real time (system emergencies or energy price 
fluctuations)—may be highly variable and are often short-term. In contrast, investments in EE 
measures typically produce a fairly certain stream of savings over a multi-year period (i.e. the 
economic lifetime of the measure) which the customer can value at expected retail energy rates.  
 
Given these differences, we make the following observations and recommendations on methods 
for estimating DR market potential: 
• For residential and small commercial direct load control programs, customer load impact estimates 
can be derived from bottom-up engineering approaches or statistical evaluations of samples of 
participating customers with appropriate metering. 
• For large customer DR options that rely on customer-initiated response to prices (e.g., hourly or 
critical-peak pricing) or curtailment incentives (e.g., short notice emergency or price response 
event programs), we recommend an elasticity approach.5 
• Participation should be thought of in terms of market penetration in a given year. Unfortunately, 
participation is the most difficult aspect of DR options to estimate, due to a limited experience 
base. With time and experience, this should improve. 
• Because of the  limited experience base for many DR options, approaches that rely on customer 
survey response to hypothetical DR options, or benchmarking, are probably not all that 
meaningful. The “best practices” approach, which has been used in some EE market potential 
studies, makes most sense when there is a larger experience base (i.e., mature programs offered by 
many utilities or ISOs over a lengthy period). 
                                                 
5 We note, however, that DR programs involving reserve or capacity payments and/or penalties for non-response (e.g., 
interruptible rates, capacity programs) present difficulties in estimating elasticities, because customer incentives are less clearly 
tied to individual events.  
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A Framework for Estimating Large Customer DR Market Potential 
 
We propose a framework for estimating large customer DR market potential in a given jurisdiction 
or utility service territory that involves five steps: 
• Establishing the study scope—identifying the target population and types of DR options to be 
considered; 
• Customer segmentation—identifying “customer market segments” among the target population; 
• Estimating net program penetration rates—using available data to estimate customer enrollment 
in voluntary programs and customer exposure to default pricing programs; 
• Estimating price response—selecting an appropriate measure of price response (price elasticity of 
demand, substitution elasticity or arc elasticity) given available data, and developing elasticity 
estimates for various DR options, customer market segments, and factors found to influence price 
response from the observed load response of customers exposed to DR options; and 
• Estimating load impacts—combining the above steps to estimate the expected DR that can be 
expected from the target population at a reference price. 
 
We applied this methodology, using available data on large customer participation and response, 
to estimate the market potential for several DR options at an illustrative urban utility in the Northeastern 
U.S.  
 
Establishing the Study Scope 
We limited our analysis to large, non-residential customers with peak demand greater than 350 
kW and examined the five different types of DR options described in Table 1. 
We analyzed these options independently and did not account for possible interactions between 
different options should they be offered simultaneously to a given set of customers. Thus, our results 
likely overestimate the combined market potential for these DR programs and dynamic pricing tariffs 
should two or more of them be offered to the same customers at once. 
Our data sources for participation rates and price elasticities for each of these DR options are 
provided in Table 2. 
 
Customer Segmentation 
Analysts conducting DR market potential studies should use available information about the target 
population to identify customer market segments that are expected to respond in similar ways, or that 
could be approached with specific marketing strategies or program designs. 
For this study, we adopted five market segments based on SIC codes—manufacturing, 
government/education, commercial/retail, healthcare, and public works—that Goldman et al. (2005) 
found to be well correlated with differences in large, non-residential customers’ willingness to participate 
in and respond to DR options. 
 
Table 1. DR Options Included in Market Potential Simulation 
DR Option Description 
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DR Option Description 
Optional hourly 
pricing 
• A dynamic pricing tariff with bundled charges for delivery and commodity offered on an optional 
basis 
• Typical rate design is a two-part structure, in which a customer baseline load (CBL) is established 
and billed at an otherwise-applicable tariff rate (either TOU or flat rate), with deviations in actual 
usage above and below the CBL billed at hourly prices  
Default hourly 
pricing 
• A dynamic pricing tariff, in which commodity costs are unbundled from other rate components (e.g. 
distribution and transmission charges), offered as default service in states with retail competition 
•  Commodity usage is billed at an hourly rate, typically indexed to an organized wholesale energy 
market (e.g. day-ahead or real-time energy market)  
Short-notice 
emergency 
program 
• A program that offers customers financial incentives for curtailing load when called by a program 
operator on short notice (i.e., 1-2 hours) in response to system emergencies 
• Typically, customer response is voluntary (i.e., in some programs, no penalties are levied for not 
curtailing when called) 
Price-response 
event program 
• A program that pays customers for measured load reductions when day-ahead wholesale market 
prices exceed a floor 
• Some programs may include bid requirements (i.e., customers are only paid for curtailments that 
they specify in advance) and/or penalties for failing to respond when committed  
Critical-peak 
pricing 
• A dynamic-pricing tariff similar to a time-of-use rate most of the time, with the exception that on 
declared “critical-peak” days, a pre-specified higher price comes into effect for a specific time 
period  
 
Table 2. Data Sources 
DR Option Data Source(s) Eligible 
Customers 
(peak 
demand) 
Reference 
Optional hourly 
pricing 
Central and Southwest (CSW) Utilities’ (now 
American Electric Power) two-part RTP rate 
> 1,500 kW Boisvert et al. (2004) 
Default hourly 
pricing 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 
(NMPC), a National Grid Company, SC-3A 
tariff 
> 2000 kW Goldman et al. (2005) 
NYISO Emergency DR Program (EDRP) > 100 kW Neenan et al. (2003) Short-notice 
emergency 
program 
 
ISO-NE Real-Time DR (RTDR) Program > 100 kW RLW Analytics and Neenan 
Associates (2003, 2004 and 2005) 
Price-response 
event program 
ISO-NE Real-Time Price Response (RTPR) 
Program 
> 100 kW  RLW Analytics and Neenan 
Associates (2003, 2004 and 2005) 
Critical-peak 
pricing 
California Utilities1 Critical Peak Pricing 
Program 
> 200 kW;  
> 100 kW for 
SDG&E 
Quantum Consulting, Inc. and 
Summit Blue Consulting, LLC (2004 
and 2006) 
1 Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) offer a critical-
peak pricing tariff to large customers. The tariff design is quite different from that of the California Statewide Pricing Pilot that 
primarily targeted residential customers (Charles River Associates 2005). 
 
Estimating Net Program Penetration Rates 
The next step is to estimate customer participation rates for DR options included in the study. 
Participation can imply: (1) customer enrollment in voluntary DR programs and tariffs, or (2) the 
retention of customers in tariffs implemented as the default service (i.e., the number of customers who do 
 6
not switch to an alternative offering).  
DR participation is often fluid. Customers may enroll in a program for one or more years, and 
subsequently drop out. They may subsequently re-enroll in the program, or others may take their place. 
The benefits of customer participation are generally only realized while the customer is enrolled in the 
program (or exposed to hourly prices).6 Thus, participation in DR options can be viewed as penetration in 
a given year “n” (or other applicable timeframe), as follows:  
 
Penetrationn = participantsn-1 – dropoutsn + new enrolleesn 
 
This can be estimated separately for each customer market segment defined in the previous step, 
and the results added up to determine the overall penetration for the population of eligible customers. 
This way of thinking about DR potential is useful for evaluating an established program over 
multiple years, particularly in the context of changes to program rules or incentives, or to the level and/or 
volatility of market prices. From the standpoint of a new, hypothetical program, it may be acceptable to 
view participation as penetration in a “typical” year of a mature program, with the understanding that a 
multi-year ramp-up period will be necessary, and that ongoing penetration may be subject to fluctuations 
due to factors both within and out of the program operator’s control. 
Analysts have used a number of methods to estimate penetration rates of DR programs (see 
Goldman et al. (2007) for discussion of various approaches). Each has pros and cons, in part because there 
is not yet a broad set of information on customer response to various DR options in a variety of settings. 
Program penetration rates present the largest uncertainty in this framework, because experience is 
piecemeal, and because of data limitations. We strongly recommend evaluating the impact of a range of 
participation levels, rather than relying on a single point estimate.  
We compiled participation rates by market segment and customer size for each DR option in our 
simulation (see Table 3). Our goal was to gather data on program participation based on relatively mature 
programs with 3–4 years of operation. Where possible, we used actual program participation data from 
the data sources in Table 2. We filled in gaps by surveying program managers of similar programs and 
tariffs, and inferring data from other market segments or programs; these data are indicated in red italic 
font in Table 3.7 
The highest participation rates are observed for large customers (>1 MW) in the default hourly 
pricing tariff. We believe this is largely explained by the default, “opt out” nature of the tariff, which 
tends to increase participation rates because some customers decide not to decide. In a default hourly 
pricing tariff, participation is defined as not selecting an alternative electricity supplier, rather than as the 
conscious decision to sign up that characterizes the other programs and tariffs.8  
 
Table 3. Participation Rates in DR Programs and Dynamic Pricing Tariffs 
Customer Size (peak demand) DR Option Business Type 
0.35–0.5 MW 0.5–1 MW 1–2 MW >2 MW 
Optional Commercial/retail 0% 0% 1% 2% 
                                                 
6 However, the experience of responding to a particular program may provide benefits beyond that particular program if the 
customer subsequently exhibits DR behavior in other programs or dynamic pricing options that were learned in the initial 
program.  
7 For the two short-notice emergency programs, information on the number of participating customers was available from 
NYISO and ISO-NE. However, neither agency collects information on the number of customers eligible for their programs. 
We constructed eligible population data from information obtained from third party sources (see Goldman et al. 2007). 
8 The default hourly pricing participation rates do not include those customers that switched to competitive retailers and 
entered into contracts in which they faced hourly prices indexed to day-ahead or real-time markets for some or all of their load. 
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Customer Size (peak demand) DR Option Business Type 
0.35–0.5 MW 0.5–1 MW 1–2 MW >2 MW 
Government/education 3% 4% 6% 25% 
Healthcare 0% 0% 1% 2% 
Manufacturing 3% 5% 6% 25% 
hourly pricing 
 
Public works 0% 0% 3% 20% 
Commercial/retail 4.3% 11% 50% 43% 
Government/education 4.2% 10% 30% 42% 
Healthcare 0.7% 1.8% 50% 7.1% 
Manufacturing 3.3% 8.3% 29% 33% 
Default 
hourly pricing 
 
Public works 3.7% 9.2% 50% 37% 
Commercial/retail 1.2% 23% 5.5% 20% 
Government/education 0.3% 5.3% 2.6% 9% 
Healthcare 0.6% 4.2% 4.3% 22% 
Manufacturing 0.2% 15% 17% 23% 
Short-notice 
emergency 
program 
 
 
Public works 1.1% 10% 67% 17% 
Commercial/retail 0.3% 0.8% 1.8% 5.7% 
Government/education 0.3% 2.9% 4.1% 10% 
Healthcare 0.3% 1.6% 8.9% 22% 
Manufacturing 5.7% 10% 9.1% 30% 
Price-
response 
event 
program 
Public works 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 1.1% 
Commercial/retail 0.9% 3.1% 5.2% 4.2% 
Government/education 1.5% 4.1% 2.3% 1.9% 
Healthcare 0.9% 3.1% 5.2% 4.2% 
Manufacturing 0.9% 4.5% 7.3% 6.9% 
Critical-peak 
pricing 
 
Public works 1.2% 3.3% 1.3% 2.8% 
Note: Red-italicized figures are based on expert judgment. 
 
Another factor that strongly impacts participation rates is the definition and size of the eligible 
customer population. For the default hourly pricing tariff, only a specific set of large customers, with peak 
demand above 2 MW were eligible. In contrast, the other DR programs were open to significantly wider 
classes of customers. The threshold for the critical-peak pricing program was 100 or 200 kW (depending 
on the utility). For the ISO programs, eligibility is defined not by customer size class, but by a minimum 
allowable load reduction (i.e., 100 kW). To develop participation rates, we constructed the pool of eligible 
customers, assuming that the 100 kW minimum load reduction would be feasible among customers with 
peak demands of 350 kW and above9—thus, a very large number of non-residential customers in New 
York and the New England states were considered “eligible” for the ISO programs. Consequently, even 
though the actual number of participants (100–400 customers) is comparable across the programs and 
tariffs, the denominators range from hundreds to thousands of eligible customers. 
A number of additional factors may influence rates of customer participation in DR programs and 
tariffs, including: program design features such as the structure and level of incentive payments, penalties 
for non-performance, and the duration, frequency and advance notice of events; customer familiarity with 
                                                 
9 Though allowed in the program rules, load aggregators were not that active in these short-notice emergency DR programs 
(although they were active in the NYISO ICAP/SCR program). With aggregation, the pool of “eligible” customers would be 
even less well-defined.  
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or reputation of the entity administering the program; the effectiveness of marketing and/or customer 
education efforts; and the availability of technical or financial assistance. 
 
Estimating Price Response 
The next step in this framework is to assign price elasticities to each customer market segment, for 
each type of DR option, using available information on how similar customers have responded to high 
prices or program events afforded by similar DR options. 
Analysts typically measure consumer response to changes in electricity prices with one of three 
measures of price elasticity: the price elasticity of demand, the elasticity of substitution, and the arc price 
elasticity of demand. All are estimated from a sample of observed customer electricity usage data in the 
face of changing prices.  
From a theoretical standpoint, the price elasticity of demand (also known as the “own-price” 
elasticity) provides the most consistent characterization of consumer behavior. However, its estimation 
requires data on customers’ production output, or the utility they derive from electricity usage, that is 
usually not available.10 A number of studies of large customer price response have instead estimated 
substitution elasticities, which are also grounded in economic theory and can be estimated without output 
data, but impose assumptions about how customers use electricity. Arc elasticities are much easier to 
compute (only a limited number of observations of customer loads and prices are necessary) but this 
comes at the cost of limited explanatory power.  
The tradeoffs between theoretical consistency and the amount of data required to estimate these 
three elasticity measures are summarized in Figure 1. As a general rule of thumb, analysts should choose 
the measure with the greatest theoretical consistency possible given available data.  
For each DR option included in our simulation, we calculated elasticity values, disaggregated by 
market segment, using individual customer load and price data. For the two hourly pricing tariffs, we 
estimated demand models to calculate substitution elasticities.11 For the other programs, insufficient 
numbers of observations covering too small a range of prices were available to estimate a fully specified 
demand model, so we calculated arc elasticities. 12 The resulting average elasticity values estimated for 
each program and market segment are presented in Table 4.13 
Studies of customer price response indicate that there is considerable diversity in how customers 
respond to similar prices and incentives, even among customer market segments. External factors—such 
as high-price or program event characteristics and weather—and customer-specific characteristics or 
circumstances—such as customer experience, ownership of onsite generation and other enabling 
technologies, and electricity intensity—may influence price response. Unfortunately, insufficient 
information was available among our data sources to evaluate the impacts of most such factors (see 
Goldman et al. 2007).  
 
                                                 
10 Those analysts that have estimated own-price elasticities derived a proxy for firm output or customer utility that assumes a 
cyclical pattern. 
11 For more details, see Goldman et al. (2005) and Boisvert et al. (2004). 
12 Substitution and arc elasticity values are not directly comparable, although the market potential impacts derived from them 
are. 
13 For the price response event program, a number of program events occurred when prices were quite low ($100–150/MWh). 
Including observations from these low-price events resulted in extremely high average elasticities, because there was 
considerable variation in loads, but relatively small price differentials. To remove this “noise” from the elasticity estimates, we 
restricted our analysis to observations where the price was $150/MWh or higher. 
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Figure 1. Features of Price Elasticity Measures 
 
Table 4. Average Elasticity Values 
DR Option Customer Market 
Segment Optional 
Hourly 
Pricing 
Default 
Hourly 
Pricing 
Short-notice 
Emergency 
Program 
Price Response 
Event 
Program 
Critical-peak 
Pricing 
Commercial/retail 0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.10 
Government/education 0.01 0.10 -0.02 -0.16 -0.06 
Healthcare 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 
Manufacturing 0.26 0.16 -0.04 -0.16 -0.05 
Public works 0.07 0.02 -0.08 -0.22 -0.08 
Note: Elasticity of substitution values are shown for optional and default hourly pricing; arc elasticity values are shown for all other DR 
options. 
 
However, for one of the short-notice emergency programs (NYISO EDRP), enough information 
was available to differentiate response among customers owning onsite generation from those without this 
technology. On average, customers in this DR program with onsite generators had arc elasticities about 
40% higher than customers that did not. This translates to elasticity values for customers without onsite 
generation that are 14% lower than the average elasticities for each market segment (see Table 5). For 
those with onsite generation, the elasticity values are 52% higher than the average. 
We also refined the elasticity estimates to reflect customer response at high prices (> $450/MWh). 
The base case elasticity estimates were evaluated over a range of prices, and this refinement tests the 
sensitivity of the estimates to this assumption.14 Our market potential simulations assume an “event” (or 
high hourly) price of $500/MWh, so this refinement brings the elasticity estimates in closer alignment 
                                                 
14 Applying average elasticities derived from a range of price levels to estimate response to a specific price may be misleading 
if customers respond differently at different price thresholds. Goldman et al. (2005) found statistically significant differences in 
customer price response at different prices. 
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with the simulated conditions. 
 
Table 5. Arc Elasticity Values Adjusted for Onsite Generation 
Short-notice Emergency Program Customer Market Segment 
without DG with DG 
Commercial/retail -0.03 -0.05 
Government/education -0.02 -0.03 
Healthcare -0.03 -0.05 
Manufacturing -0.04 -0.07 
Public works -0.07 -0.12 
 
For the default hourly pricing option, high-price substitution elasticities were developed using a 
flexible model that allowed for statistical evaluation of response at different price thresholds (see 
Goldman et al. 2005). We applied adjustment factors derived from this model to each market segment to 
develop elasticities tailored to response at high prices. 
For the arc-elasticity values calculated from the DR programs, we simply eliminated observations 
for which the event price was below $450/MWh, and recomputed average elasticities for each sector and 
program from this smaller set of observations. 
The resulting elasticity values of customer response to high prices are presented in Table 6. For 
the default hourly pricing tariff, commercial/retail and government/education customers increase their 
response at high prices while there is no change in manufacturing customers’ response.  
 
Table 6. Elasticities Based on Customer Response to High Prices ($500/MWh) 
DR Option Customer Market Segment 
Default Hourly 
Pricing 
Short-notice 
Emergency 
Program 
Price Response 
Event Program 
Critical-peak 
Pricing 
Commercial/retail 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 
Government/education 0.16 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
Healthcare 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 
Manufacturing 0.16 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
Public works 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 
Note: Elasticity of substitution values are shown for optional and default hourly pricing; arc elasticity values are shown for all other DR 
options. 
 
Very few of the observations for the two short-notice emergency programs involved event prices 
lower than $450/MWh, so the revised elasticity estimates are essentially unchanged.15 
For the price response event program and critical-peak pricing, the elasticities shown in Table 6 
decrease compared to the averages in Table 4 in all market segments. This occurs because these 
customers’ load response (the numerator in the arc elasticity) was fairly consistent across the range of 
prices, while the price differential (the denominator) increases with higher event prices. We believe that 
                                                 
15 The program design of the NYISO EDRP program sets a floor price of $500/MWh, so none of these observations were 
removed. ISO-NE’s emergency program offers two floor-price options—$500/MWh and $250/MWh—depending on the 
amount of notice customers receive of impending events. 
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this result may be partly attributable to the program design and is also consistent with the notion that 
many large business and institutional customers are only willing to curtail or forego load which they 
consider “discretionary.” Restricting the dataset to events with higher prices therefore results in lower 
average elasticities. This effect is relatively minor for the critical-peak pricing example, but is quite 
pronounced for the price response event program (compare elasticity values in Table 4 vs. Table 6).   
 
 
Estimating Load Impacts 
The final step is to pull together all the pieces to estimate aggregate load impacts, which should be 
done separately for each DR option under consideration.16  
For each customer market segment, program penetration rates should be applied to the target 
population in that segment. Then, elasticity values are applied to the customers in each market segment, 
allocating any factor-specific elasticity estimates (such as those developed for customers with and without 
onsite generation in the previous section) to those customers to whom they apply. 
Once each customer has been assigned an elasticity value, it remains to translate the results into an 
estimate of aggregate load impacts for a range of expected prices or incentive levels. The methods for 
doing this depend on the type of elasticity estimated (e.g., substitution or arc elasticity). Goldman et al. 
(2007) discusses these methods in detail. Once the load impacts have been established (in MW), they can 
be expressed as a percentage of the peak demand of the applicable customer class. 
To demonstrate the application of our methodology, we applied our compiled participation rate 
and elasticity values to information on the customer population of an urban utility in the Northeastern 
U.S. to develop market potential estimates.  The selected utility is relatively small; the peak demand of its 
large, non-residential customers is ~1,700 MW. These customers represent about 40% of the utility’s peak 
demand, and consist largely of commercial/retail, government/education and healthcare facilities. 
Manufacturing customers are less prevalent than is typical among utilities that serve suburban or rural 
communities. 
 To estimate load impacts, we used business-class-specific load profiles derived from NMPC SC-
3A customer data to establish “expected” customer loads absent DR (i.e., customer baseline loads). We 
also assumed an “event” (or high hourly) price of $500/MWh for all DR options. This is fairly typical of 
the high prices observed in hourly pricing programs, as well as incentive floor prices offered by ISO 
emergency programs, in recent years. 
We developed five scenarios to demonstrate the effects of various factors on DR market potentials 
and to evaluate the robustness of the substitution and arc elasticities to changes in the simulation 
inputs;we highlight results from several of the scenarios (see Goldman et al (2007) for complete results). 
 
Base Case. The base-case scenario uses average elasticity values by market segment (Table 4), and the 
participation rates in Table 3 to estimate market potential for each DR option. The results range from 
<1% to 3% of the peak demand of the target population of customers larger than 350 kW (see Table 7).17 
The load reductions for the largest customers (>1 MW) enrolled in the default hourly pricing and price 
response event programs represent 5-6% of their aggregate peak demand. The highest market potential 
(3% of peak demand) corresponds to the default hourly pricing tariff—this is largely due to relatively high 
customer acceptance rates for this tariff.  
                                                 
16 Analysts may wish to account for interactive effects arising from program eligibility rules that limit participation in multiple 
programs. 
17 We did not have access to class-level peak demand for the Northeastern utility. To approximate class-peak demand, we 
summed individual customers’ peak demands. Because they are not simultaneous, this overestimates the actual class peak (and 
therefore under-estimates the proportional load impacts).  
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Table 7. Market Potential Results: Base Case 
Optional Hourly 
Pricing 
Default Hourly 
Pricing 
Short-notice 
Emergency 
Program 
Price Response 
Event Program 
Critical-peak 
Pricing 
Customer 
Size 
(MW) 
MW % of class 
peak 
demand1 
MW % of class 
peak 
demand1 
MW % of class 
peak 
demand1 
MW % of class 
peak 
demand1 
MW % of class 
peak 
demand1 
0.35–0.5  1.0 0% 2.8 0% 0.4 0% 1.6 0% 1.3 0% 
0.5–1 1.1 0% 3.9 1% 4.3 1% 3.0 1% 1.7 1% 
1–2 1.9 1% 14.4 6% 3.8 2% 3.9 2% 1.9 1% 
> 2 21.6 4% 34.8 6% 11.5 2% 29.1 5% 2.4 0% 
Total 25.6 2% 55.9 3% 19.9 1% 37.6 2% 7.3 <1% 
1 Peak demand is non-coincident. 
Note: Each DR option was evaluated separately—the results are not additive. 
 
Impact of Program Participation Rates. Market assessments often examine the impact of differing rates 
of participation on program potential. Figure 2 illustrates the impact of aggressively marketing programs 
or promoting optional tariffs to achieve two and three times the base-case participation rates, which reflect 
current DR experience. The results, on the order of 3–6% of non-residential peak demand, can be viewed 
as an approximate upper bound on DR potentials.18 For default hourly pricing, which by definition would 
not be marketed to customers, we do not show enhanced participation, although the base-case results are 
included in the figure for comparison.  
 
Accounting for Onsite Generation. We examined the impact of refining the short-notice emergency 
program elasticity estimates to account for the influence of onsite generation technology on customer 
response (see Table 8). This resulted in slightly lower market potential estimates than the base case for 
this DR option (i.e., 17.6 versus 19.9 MW). This is due to our assumptions about the distribution of onsite 
generators among the customer population at the illustrative urban utility compared to the observed 
distribution among the customers from whom the elasticity estimates were estimated.19 
Although the overall market potential estimates are comparable in this example, understanding 
differences in the underlying elasticities among customers with and without enabling technologies can 
help policymakers target programs to customers that are likely to be the most responsive (e.g. those with 
on-site generation equipment). 
 
                                                 
18 These results assume that the additional enrolled customers are just as responsive to price signals or emergencies as the 
relatively “early adopters” observed among our data sources. In reality, it may be that the most responsive customers are also 
the first to sign up, leading to declining average elasticities as more customers enroll. On the other hand, strategies that 
combine program marketing with technical assistance to develop fully automated DR could enhance both participation rates 
and response to prices or emergencies. 
19 Detailed information on the distribution of onsite generators among the Northeast utility’s customers was not available. To 
perform the simulation, we developed onsite generation penetration rates from building survey data (see Goldman et al. 2007). 
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Note: Elasticities are assumed constant over all participation scenarios—this assumption has yet to be evaluated with actual 
program experience. 
Figure 2. Impact of Program Participation on DR Market Potential 
 
Table 8. Market Potential Results: Onsite Generation 
Short-notice Emergency Program Customer Size 
(MW) 
MW % of class peak dmd1 
0.35–0.5  0.3 0% 
0.5–1 3.7 1% 
1–2 3.4 1% 
> 2 10.2 2% 
Total 17.6 1% 
1 Peak demand is non-coincident. 
 
Accounting for Response at High Prices. In this scenario, we refined the elasticity estimates of four of 
the program types to better reflect customer response at the $500/MWh event price assumed for these 
simulations. Comparing the results in Table 9 with the base case (Table 7) reveals that for the default 
hourly pricing program, accounting for differences in response at higher prices results in higher market 
potential (i.e., 74 versus 55 MW). This result is driven by the fact that customers in certain market 
segments (government/education and commercial/retail) were more price-responsive at higher prices and 
our illustrative utility had a high proportion of these types of customers.  
 
Table 9. Market Potential Results: Response at High Prices 
Default Hourly 
Pricing 
Short-notice 
Emergency Program 
Price Response Event 
Program 
Critical-peak Pricing Customer Size 
(MW) 
MW % of class 
peak demand1 
MW % of class 
peak demand1
MW % of class 
peak demand1 
MW % of class 
peak demand1
0.35–0.5  4.1 1% 0.4 0% 0.3 0% 0.7 0% 
0.5–1 5.7 2% 4.2 1% 0.5 0% 1.0 0% 
1–2 19.2 8% 3.7 2% 0.7 0% 1.0 0% 
> 2 45.3 8% 11.1 2% 5.1 1% 1.3 0% 
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Default Hourly 
Pricing 
Short-notice 
Emergency Program 
Price Response Event 
Program 
Critical-peak Pricing 
Total 74.2 4% 19.4 1% 6.6 0% 4.1 0% 
1 Peak demand is non-coincident. 
Note: Each DR option was evaluated separately—the results are not additive. 
 
In contrast, for the price response event program and critical-peak pricing, restricting observations 
to only high-price events resulted in lower average arc elasticities in all market segments. The arc 
elasticity values are lower for these options because participating customers provided similar load 
reductions at low prices (~$200/MWh) as they did above $450/MWh (i.e., the percentage change in load 
remains the same during the high price event hours, while the percentage change in price increases). As a 
result, the market potential estimates are lower for these two programs than the base case that used 
average elasticities across all observed prices. Because the short-notice emergency program elasticities 
were virtually unchanged (see Table 6), the difference in market potential relative to the base case is 
negligible. 
This scenario demonstrates the limitations of arc elasticities in accounting for influences other 
than price on customer load changes. Because only prices and load at a single event are captured, there is 
no way to account or correct for noise in the estimates (i.e. other factors that drive changes in customer 
usage). At higher prices, we believe that changes in load are more likely a result of prices rather than 
other factors. When arc elasticities are used, it is therefore important to be cognizant of these limitations 
and ensure that observations are drawn from conditions similar to those being simulated. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The above simulations illustrate possible ranges of DR market potential for large commercial and 
industrial customers at an urban Northeast utility, as well as several methodological and data issues. The 
results are tied to the characteristics of this urban utility’s large customer base as well as the specific 
assumptions we made about prices and other factors in the various scenarios. Nonetheless, we draw the 
following insights and conclusions from our scoping study of DR market potential: 
• We believe that the results provide a reasonable first approximation of the range of DR market 
potential among non-residential customers if offered similar DR options by similar utilities. 
While the observed load reductions—1% to 3% of the peak demand of the target population of 
large customers—are modest, a number of studies suggest that a little DR can often go a long way 
towards ameliorating system emergencies or high prices. If policymakers or regulators establish 
higher DR goals, then our results suggest that the DR market potential of all customer classes 
should be considered—not just large commercial and industrial customers. Pilot program results 
suggest that enabling technologies and automated DR can also increase both the number of 
customers willing to participate in DR options as well as the predictability and consistency of their 
load response.  
• The simulations illustrate the relative impact of certain factors, particularly customer 
participation rates, on potential aggregate load reductions of large customers. Participation 
rates currently represent the largest data uncertainty for analysts undertaking market potential 
studies. Yet achieving higher participation rates among eligible large customers is critical for 
obtaining a significant amount of price-responsive load. Assessment of DR potential should 
attempt to account for the level of program resources (e.g. education, training, technical 
assistance) that will be devoted to program implementation and which may influence participation 
rates.  
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• The scenarios also demonstrate the importance of refining elasticity estimates rather than 
applying average values. In several cases, this resulted in lower market potential estimates in our 
simulations. Policymakers considering establishing DR goals should be aware that goals 
extrapolated from pilot programs or DR potential study estimates based only on small samples of 
very responsive customers may not be achievable. 
• Finally, we emphasize that all DR market potential studies should examine a range of 
scenarios—not limited to those demonstrated here—in estimating DR market potential. 
 
Recommendations 
 
To advance the state of knowledge about customer response to DR programs and dynamic pricing 
tariffs and facilitate DR market assessments, we recommend that state and federal policymakers and 
regulators encourage utilities, retailers and Independent System Operators/Regional Transmission 
Organizations and their program evaluators conduct the following activities:  
1. Link Program Evaluation to Market Potential Studies: Evaluations of DR programs should 
systematically collect data on the characteristics of participating customers; hourly customer loads and 
prices; other factors found to be relevant drivers of customer participation and response; and 
information on the size and characteristics of the target or eligible population. 
2. Program Participation: Develop predictive methods for estimating participation rates in DR 
programs and dynamic pricing tariffs that incorporate customer characteristics and other factors that 
drive participation. Where applicable, studies should include interactive effects of multiple program 
offerings in estimating market penetration rates. 
3. Price Response: Estimate price elasticity values for different market segments, accounting for the 
relative impact of driving factors, and report methods and results transparently. Where possible, we 
recommend that provisions be made to estimate demand or substitution elasticities, using fully 
specified demand models, rather than arc elasticities.  
4. Assess the Impacts of DR-Enabling Technologies: For large customers, there is still a need to 
document the impacts of specific DR enabling technologies on customer participation and load 
response, given limited evidence and mixed results from existing evaluations. At a minimum, program 
evaluators should gather information on customer’s load curtailment strategies that involve onsite 
generation,20 peak load controls, energy management control systems, energy information systems, 
and any other technologies disseminated as part of technical assistance programs. 
5. Publicize Results: Explore ways to pool customer-level data, while protecting customer 
confidentiality, so that information to support DR market assessments is available in a standardized 
format. 
 
These activities would provide more detailed and robust price response and participation rate 
values that can support DR market assessment activities. However, in order to make best use of this 
information, utilities, ISOs/RTOs, and states will need disaggregated information on the characteristics of 
their target population of customers (e.g., customer loads by size range, market segments, enabling 
technology deployment). Some of this information is not typically collected by utilities on their 
customers. Therefore, we recommend that states, utilities and their consultants conducting DR market 
                                                 
20 Information on diesel-fired emergency back-up generators should be tracked separately from cogeneration, combined heat 
and power, and other distributed energy technologies. 
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assessments first assess the availability of information on customer characteristics and usage in their 
jurisdictions and include plans to collect or estimate any necessary incremental information in their study 
plans and budgets. 
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